

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Turner to Brzezinski Memo on Scientific Exchange  
with the USSR (ER 77-133/4 of 21 April 1977)

1. Bob Kimmitt of the NSC called me to let me know that the attached memo from the DCI to Brzezinski has been the subject of discussions between NSC, OSTP, State and Defense and that Frank Press (the President's science adviser) is looking at this issue as part of a growing concern with the entire West to East technology transfer policy problem.
2. Kimmitt wanted us to know that NSC is not dropping the ball although they are not yet ready to provide any new guidance.
3. Kimmitt is now working on the creation of a new PRM exercise on technology transfer and export controls which will be handled through the SCC rather than the PRC mechanism. The PRM is to be chaired by Ben Huberman of Frank Press's office and cochaired by Jessica Tuchman. The scientific data exchange issue will presumably be folded into that exercise.
4. I doubt that Admiral Turner needs to be bothered with this procedural matter at this time. I am circulating this memo to [redacted], Executive Secretariat, IC Staff (McMahon), and Chairman, COMEX ([redacted]) for their info so that the loop on the attached memo is closed.

[redacted]  
National Intelligence Officer  
for Economics

Attachment:  
ER 77-133/4

cy - SA/DCI [redacted]  
ER -

REF ID: A66111  
The Director of Central Intelligence

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80M00165A0018001

0008-6 Executive Registry
77-133/4

*Defence*  
21 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Exchange of U.S. Scientific and Technical Data  
with Communist Nations

1. Attached is a series of exchange correspondence between the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense wherein the DCI expressed his concern about the expanding exchange of U.S. scientific and technical data with Communist nations and urged the Department of Defense to take certain actions which might aid in the protection of classified U.S. information.

2. At the same time the DCI stimulated several of the DCI committees to develop a plan of attack on the problem from an intelligence standpoint.

3. In early April Deputy Secretary Duncan indicated that he was directing certain elements of his staff to study several of the problems associated with exchange data with a view towards devising the necessary organizational arrangements to deal with them. He recommended that I call this problem to the attention of the National Security Council so that the Defense efforts could be addressed in concert with other departments, particularly the Departments of State and Commerce.

4. We would welcome the National Security Council's advice and guidance on this matter.

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Attachments:

1. Ltr DCI fr DepSecDef 6 Apr 77 (ER 77-133/3)
2. Ltr DepSecDef fr DCI 5 Apr 77 (ER 77-133/2A)
3. Ltr DCI fr DepSecDef 19 Mar 77 (ER 77-133/2)
4. Ltr SecDef fr DCI 12 Jan 77 (ER 77-133)

25X1

*Defense*

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Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110008-6

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110008-6

77-135/251

5 APR 1977

The Honorable Charles W. Duncan, Jr.  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Charlie:

I appreciate your calling the DCI's 12 January 1977 letter to my attention. Technology transfer and the exchange of scientific and technical data well merit close scrutiny. Whatever the Department of Defense can do to strengthen its support to the procedures devised to monitor the exchange, I believe is highly desirable.

I endorse the 12 January letter and appreciate your attention.

Yours,

*[Signature]*

STANSFIELD TURNER  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

- 1 - DCI
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Dep COMEX


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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301


19 MAR 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Stan:

Attached is a 12 January 77 memorandum from George Bush on the subject of U.S. exchange of scientific and technical data with Communist nations. Although we are prepared to respond in a positive fashion to George's suggestions I would like to have the benefit of your own thinking before we move further.

Sincerely yours,

  
Charles W. Duncan, Jr.

Attachment  
a/s

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SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

SECRET//NOFORN//LS//ENSE

12 January 1977

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
The Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Don:

There is concern throughout the U.S. Government about the expanding U.S. exchange of scientific and technical data with Communist nations through the visits of delegations, development of cooperative joint projects, and commercial agreements. The Intelligence Community has only a limited role in assisting those who attempt to maintain a relative balance in what the U.S. gains and loses through these programs. Our efforts in recent years to perform this function, however, have been frustrated by the scope of the programs, lack of centralized U.S. management and the absence of any systematic record of the who-what-where of U.S. Communist contacts.


At the present time I have energized the DCI Committee on Exchanges, the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee, and the Economic Intelligence Committee to draw some focus and develop a plan of attack on this problem from an intelligence standpoint. This is an enormous task.

The Department of Defense plays a large role in U.S. Government mechanisms to administer and assess these programs through its involvements in export control, protection of classified U.S. defense information, and the DCI Committees mentioned. I would like to call to your attention some actions which the Department could take which would assist this process:

(a) Revision of DoD Directive No. C3115.5 of 11 February 1964:



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(b) Reconsideration of DoD support to the Interdepartmental Committee for Internal Security (ICIS).


ICIS develops internal security procedures for Communist nation visitors to the U.S. and establishes U.S. visa procedures for these visitors. ICIS regulations provide the only legal basis for the State Department's provision of alert information on these visitors to intelligence and security elements of the U.S. Government. Stronger ICIS enforcement of already approved procedures might be helpful.

(c) Reconsideration of DoD procedures to alert U.S. defense contractors about impending Communist visitors.

I understand that DoD currently relies on the State Department to communicate and enforce security opinions provided by DoD intelligence components to contractor facilities. State, however, lacks the authority and capability to do so.

I will appreciate your consideration of the points raised in this letter and would welcome your comments and advice.

Sincerely,



George Bush

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Distribution for DCI/IC 77-0177

Orig. - Addressee  
1 - DCI  
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1 - D/DCI/IC  
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1 - IC Registry  
1 - Chairman, COMEX  
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1 - Chairman, EIC


25X1 AD/DCI/  (18Apr77)



Distribution for DCI/IC 77-0177

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1 - Chairman, EIC

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Deputy to the DCI  
for the Intelligence Community

19 April 1977

NOTE FOR: The Director


SUBJECT : Exchange of U.S. Scientific and  
Technical Data with Communist  
Nations

Stan,

I recommend you send the attached  
package to Zbig for info.

The purpose is to bring Zbig up to date  
on the exchange of U.S. Scientific and  
Technical Data with Communist Nations.

STAT



Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	o DCI		✓		
2	DDCI		✓		
3	D/DCI/IC	✓			
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI		✓		
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8	D/DCI/NI		✓		
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10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
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15	DTR				
16	Asst/DCI				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
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SUSPENSE		18 APR 77 Date			

Remarks:

3637 (7-76)

D/ Executive Secretary  
8 APR 77  
Date

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DEFENSE

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Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110008-6

IC Registry  
77-133/BA

*Defense*

5 APR 1977

The Honorable Charles W. Duncan, Jr.  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Charlie:

I appreciate your calling the DCI's 12 January 1977 letter to my attention. Technology transfer and the exchange of scientific and technical data well merit close scrutiny. Whatever the Department of Defense can do to strengthen its support to the procedures devised to monitor the exchange, I believe is highly desirable.

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- 1 - Chairman, EIC

*Defense*

Dep COMEX [ ]  
(28Mar77)  
AD/DCI [ ]  
(rewritten 29Mar77)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: <i>ER</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

SECRET



Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110008-6

Executive Registry

77-133/2

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

19 MAR 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Stan:

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Sincerely yours,

*CW Duncan, Jr.*  
Charles W. Duncan, Jr.

Attachment  
a/s

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110008-6

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-0739

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Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110008-6  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

12 January 1977

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
The Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Don:

There is concern throughout the U.S. Government about the expanding U.S. exchange of scientific and technical data with Communist nations through the visits of delegations, development of cooperative joint projects, and commercial agreements. The Intelligence Community has only a limited role in assisting those who attempt to maintain a relative balance in what the U.S. gains and loses through these programs. Our efforts in recent years to perform this function, however, have been frustrated by the scope of the programs, lack of centralized U.S. management and the absence of any systematic record of the who-what-where of U.S. Communist contacts.

At the present time I have energized the DCI Committee on Exchanges, the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee, and the Economic Intelligence Committee to draw some focus and develop a plan of attack on this problem from an intelligence standpoint. This is an enormous task.

The Department of Defense plays a large role in U.S. Government mechanisms to administer and assess these programs through its involvements in export control, protection of classified U.S. defense information, and the DCI Committees mentioned. I would like to call to your attention some actions which the Department could take which would assist this process:

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Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110008-6

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-  
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(b) Reconsideration of DoD support to the Interdepartmental Committee for Internal Security (ICIS).


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19	DCI/SS				
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SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks:

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Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110008-6

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

DCI/IC 77-0152

Executive Registry

77-133

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
The Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D. C. 20301

12 JAN 1977

Dear Don:

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


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*Defense*

**SECRET**

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/s/ George Bush

George Bush

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- 1 - Chairman, STIC
- 1 - Chairman, EIC
- 1 - D/DCI/ [redacted]
- 1 - AD/DCI [redacted]

AD/DCI/ [redacted]

(7Jan77)

**SECRET**

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: <b>ER</b>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:  <i>NOTE: Copy of LTR was sent to DDI on 13 JAN. per request fm D/ES.</i>		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

Executive Registry

77-133/1

Deputy to the DCI  
for the Intelligence Community

10 JAN 1977

NOTE FOR THE DCI

The attached is an effort to draw DOD's attention and support to the technology transfer problem. It by no means is a comprehensive solution to technology transfer, but it is a reasonable step towards getting some handle on what the visiting Soviets are up to in the US.

STAT

Admiral, USN  
D/DCI/IC

# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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11	IG				
12	Compt				
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16	Asst/DCI				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
20	D/EE0				
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		28 MAR 77 Date			

Remarks:

Please develop DCI response.

D/E [Signature] ary  
22 MAR 77  
Date

3637 (7-76)

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*Defense*